

# The Impacts of Regional Geopolitical Conflicts on the Global Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (2019–2026)

Hyuk Kim, Ph.D.

Corresponding Author: Hyuk Kim

Otterbein University, Business, Accounting, & Economics (BAE), USA

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**ABSTRACT:** Over the past seven years (2019–2026), geopolitical conflicts have shifted from localized background hazards to primary drivers of global supply chain restructuring. This manuscript examines how regional geopolitical conflicts—specifically the Russia-Ukraine war, the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran war, and long-standing the U.S.–China trade hostilities—fundamentally alter global manufacturing, sourcing, and logistics networks. Integrating supply chain operations literature with international relations (IR) literature, I map how state-level frictions cascade into systemic, broader operational vulnerabilities. Empirical data across these conflicts reveal significant operational costs, including a 29.5% reduction in maritime port throughput within conflict zones, an overnight paralysis of automotive value chains due to specialized component blockades, severe energy shocks derived from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and threats to subsea digital infrastructure. To survive ongoing sovereign rivalries, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are shifting away from the traditional 'just-in-time' (JIT) efficiency paradigm toward 'just-in-case' (JIC) architectural configurations. This structural realignment manifests as supply chain Balkanization, near-shoring, and friend-shoring, dividing once-interconnected global networks into politically insulated trading blocs. Ultimately, this paper establishes that supply chain viability in the modern geoeconomic order depends on strategic network flexibility, the institutionalization of sovereign buffer stocks, dynamic management accounting, and the harmonization of buyer-supplier risk perceptions across fragmented landscapes.

**KEY WORD:** Geopolitical Conflicts, Supply Chain Disruptions, Balkanization, Maritime Logistics, Strategic Reshoring.

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## I. Introduction

For decades, the global economy operated under an assumptions-framework of hyper-globalization. Multinational corporations built extended, lean, and highly cost-optimized networks designed to source components, assemble products, and deliver finished goods across open borders with minimal frictionless delay. In this operational theater, geographic distance was secondary to labor arbitrage and layout efficiency, giving rise to the structural dominance of the 'just-in-time' (JIT) delivery model. However, the period spanning 2019 through 2026 has witnessed an unprecedented convergence of systemic shocks that completely dismantled this stable background environment. Geopolitical conflicts, once treated as secondary or peripheral externalities by operations models, have violently reasserted themselves as the primary determinants of structural supply chain health, continuity, and corporate survival.

The contemporary transformation of the global landscape is defined by intense, overlapping regional conflicts and systemic geoeconomic fragmentation. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 severed critical upstream resource channels, cutting off downstream global industries from essential commodities, neon gas, palladium, and agricultural exports, while triggering severe energy volatility throughout Western Europe. As these land-based shocks stabilized into protracted attrition, maritime chokepoints became the next target of regional hostilities. The escalation of targeted military disruptions in the Red Sea shipping corridor beginning in late 2023 demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of primary oceanic trade arteries, forcing a mass re-routing of global container fleets. This maritime vulnerability culminated in early 2026 with the outbreak of the U.S.–Israel–Iran war. The subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent oil prices surging past \$100 per barrel, imposing more than \$25 billion in defense and operational costs on global corporations, and testing the limits of international logistics node security.

Concurrently, the structurally embedded trade and technological war between the U.S. and China has institutionalized aggressive tariff regimes, export restrictions on advanced semiconductors, and heightened regulatory barriers. Together, these events demonstrate that the physical structures of global commerce are deeply entangled with the volatile dynamics of international state-level politics. To systematically evaluate this

new reality, this manuscript synthesizes foundational academic literature and recent empirical data to chart the conceptual, empirical, and strategic dimensions of Geopolitical Supply Chain Disruptions (GSCD). By integrating operations management literature with classic theories of international relations, this body of work illustrates how macro-political hostilities cascade down into severe micro-operational failures. The purpose of this paper is to analyze these cascading impacts through a multi-layered comparative case analysis—focusing on the Russia-Ukraine War, the U.S.–Iran War, and the U.S.–China trade conflict—supported by a rigorous literature review. Through this comprehensive synthesis, we outline the emerging principles of systemic network resilience required to survive a fractured global order.

## **II. Literature Review: Theoretical Frameworks of Geopolitical Supply Chain Disruptions**

Understanding how a political decision or a regional military engagement in one corner of the world can halt a factory floor thousands of miles away requires robust conceptual tools. Historically, supply chain risk management focused heavily on localized or natural disasters, such as earthquakes, factory fires, or localized labor strikes. To bridge the gap between macroscopic state hostilities and microscopic corporate operational networks, recent scholarship has advanced specialized theoretical frameworks. Foremost among these efforts is the work of Bednarski, Subramanian et al. (2026), who formally laid the theoretical foundations for Geopolitical Supply Chain Disruptions (GSCD) by blending operations management with International Relations (IR) theories. They argue that when nation-states experience friction over sovereign borders, resource allocation, or ideological alignment, the resulting geopolitical tensions create institutional voids and physical threats that rapidly degrade cross-border networks.

This integration of disciplines is critical because traditional supply chain models often assume a politically neutral background environment. By recognizing that state-level actors routinely weaponize commercial linkages, researchers can better map how vulnerabilities propagate. In a complementary study, Bednarski et al. (2023) conducted a comprehensive, state-of-the-art literature review tracking the historical evolution of geopolitical disruptions in global logistics. Their findings reveal a permanent paradigm shift: multinational firms are no longer treating geopolitical shocks as temporary, black-swan events that can be managed with basic contingency funds. Instead, firms are being forced to accept structural risk as a constant, underlying cost of doing business. The literature emphasizes that navigating this environment requires transitioning from purely mathematical, cost-centric layout tools to strategic frameworks that explicitly incorporate state-level volatility, international trade laws, and regional security alignment into the initial configuration of the supply base (Bednarski et al., 2023).

The physical mechanisms through which these theoretical conflicts manifest are most visible within global maritime transport systems. Approximately 80% of global trade by volume is carried over water, making the entire global market highly dependent on a few narrow, highly critical geographic bottlenecks. Li (2026) explored these systemic characteristics using extensive cross-border panel data, mapping the explicit impact mechanisms through which geopolitical risk compromises logistics node security. Li (2026) identified three primary damage channels: the direct destruction or immediate military threat to physical port and vessel infrastructure, extreme freight rate volatility driven by soaring marine insurance premiums and war-risk surcharges, and a sharp drop in customs and border clearance efficiency as nations implement emergency security screening measures.

The quantitative validation of these channels is provided by Zhang (2026), who utilized an empirical difference-in-differences (DID) methodology to rigorously measure the net causal effect of regional conflicts on global maritime throughput. Focusing on the Red Sea crisis, Zhang's data revealed an astonishing 29.5% average decline in container throughput across key Mediterranean and Red Sea ports as shipping lines pulled out of the region to protect their assets. Rather than traversing the Suez Canal, carrier alliances shifted their routes entirely, sending giant container vessels on a long detour around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa (Zhang, 2026). This massive re-routing creates a profound 'butterfly effect' across global manufacturing schedules. Tseng and Pilcher (2025) investigated the micro-operational realities of this shift by analyzing real-world container ship fuel consumption data alongside semi-structured interviews with senior maritime operators. Their findings paint a picture of compounding logistical stress: bypassing standard chokepoints adds approximately 10 to 14 days of transit time for a single voyage between Asia and Northern Europe, drastically inflating bunker fuel consumption, expanding corporate greenhouse gas footprints, and trapping billions of dollars worth of inventory at sea. Tseng and Pilcher (2025) note that the crisis has dramatically altered carrier responsibilities and liability structures, as shipping lines face immense pressure from manufacturing clients who are running out of safety stock due to delayed arrivals.

### **III. Case Analysis 1: The Russia-Ukraine War and Upstream Commodity Cascades**

While maritime chokepoints demonstrate the vulnerability of transit paths, active land-based warfare reveals how deeply global manufacturing sectors depend on raw materials and specialized sub-assemblies concentrated within specific sovereign territories. The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 served as a severe stress test for multiple critical supply chains, highlighting the rapid speed at which upstream shocks propagate down to downstream consumer markets. Sarwar (2025) conducted a comprehensive systematic review of the post-invasion literature, categorizing five major disruption domains that rippled through the global economy: widespread food insecurity driven by blocked agricultural corridors, extreme energy and natural gas volatility, critical raw material shortages (most notably semiconductor-grade neon gas and palladium), severe transcontinental rail bottlenecks across Eurasia, and immediate, highly volatile financial market reactions.

In the manufacturing realm, the automotive sector emerged as a primary casualty of this regional conflict, illustrating the hazard of single-source dependencies for highly specialized components. Kim et al. (2025) published an empirical investigation documenting shock propagation within the European automotive value chain. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the sudden halt of production at specialized sub-tier suppliers in western Ukraine—who manufactured custom wire harnesses for complex vehicle electrical architectures—effectively paralyzed major automotive assembly lines across Germany, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe within days. Kim et al. (2025) demonstrated that because these components are highly customized to specific vehicle models and require labor-intensive manual assembly, automotive giants could not easily or rapidly substitute them with alternative suppliers, leading to multi-week shutdowns and billions in lost revenue.

Confronted with active conflict zones, multinational corporations have had to develop explicit operational protocols to extricate their operations from danger without causing total corporate collapse. Srai et al. (2023) analyzed these precise strategic choices, mapping out the 'impact pathways' required for unhooking complex supply networks from active combat environments. Their framework outlines the immense difficulties of network reconfiguration and structural fragmentation, offering lessons on how firms can systematically identify exposed nodes, terminate vulnerable long-term contracts, and rapidly reallocate production capacity to safer regions. This process of decoupling is rarely clean or cost-effective; rather, it represents an exercise in minimizing extreme operational loss (Srai et al., 2023).

The challenges of exiting a conflict zone extend far beyond physical logistics into complex legal, ethical, and financial domains. Wang (2025) explored this phenomenon through the lens of 'strategic abandonment,' investigating the voluntary or regulatory-driven exit of Western multinational corporations from the Russian market during the crisis. Utilizing real options theory, Wang (2025) weighed the long-term corporate reputation and compliance benefits of total market exit against the massive, immediate write-downs of fixed local assets, severed distribution networks, and the sudden loss of low-cost regional inputs. The study concludes that strategic abandonment is a highly complex, double-edged sword, where firms often sacrifice decades of capital investment to insulate themselves from long-term geopolitical exposure and severe stakeholder backlash.

Furthermore, regional warfare frequently shatters the legal and regulatory frameworks that underpin standard commerce, giving rise to highly volatile informal and illicit logistics networks. This underground dimension was investigated by Al-Nuaimi (2026) in a groundbreaking study examining the illegal restructuring of the grain supply chain inside contested Ukrainian borders. Al-Nuaimi (2026) documented how the destruction of official agricultural infrastructure and the blockade of standard Black Sea ports forced local actors to design shadow logistics networks, utilizing illicit cross-border smuggling paths, falsified documentation, and grey-market intermediaries to move agricultural commodities out of the war zone. This research underscores that when geopolitical conflicts destroy institutional frameworks, supply chains do not simply vanish; instead, they adapt by morphing into highly fragmented, irregular, and risky alternative structures to meet global demand.

Finally, the immense financial and operational volatility generated by such regional crises requires a fundamental overhaul of internal corporate tracking and planning mechanisms. El-Gazzar (2026) focused on this administrative dimension, studying the explicit implications of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on corporate management accounting practices. El-Gazzar (2026) discovered that traditional, static budgeting and rigid annual forecasting tools are entirely inadequate for handling the rapid, unpredictable price swings in fuel, raw materials, and international logistics generated by geopolitical blockades. To reduce supply chain risk, modern management accountants must implement dynamic rolling forecasts, real-time variance analysis, and advanced scenario-planning matrices that treat regional political volatility as an active financial variable rather than an exceptional line-item abnormality.

### **IV. Case Analysis 2: The U.S.–Iran Conflict and Energy/Digital Infrastructure Shocks**

If the Russia-Ukraine War demonstrated the vulnerabilities of land-based upstream material dependencies, the outbreak of the U.S.–Israel–Iran War in early 2026 exposed the fragility of global energy corridors and digital communication chokepoints. Initiated on February 28, 2026, via nationwide strikes across

Iran, the conflict quickly escalated into a major logistics crisis centered around the Strait of Hormuz—the primary maritime gateway for Gulf energy exports through which roughly 20 million barrels of crude oil and oil products transit daily.

#### **4.1 Energy Supply Shock and Macro-Economic Propagation**

The immediate operational response to the conflict was Iran's effective blockade and closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Because this single waterway handles approximately 34% of the world's seaborne crude oil trade and 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) traffic, its closure triggered an instantaneous energy supply shock. Global benchmark crude prices surged above \$100 per barrel, representing a rapid 50% spike from pre-war baselines. According to an extensive empirical meta-analysis conducted by Peprah (2026), this energy price escalation directly impaired international corporate profitability, with downstream repercussions propagating unevenly across manufacturing, chemical, and transportation sectors. The total financial damage inflicted upon global businesses quickly surpassed \$25 billion. Industrial giants such as Toyota and Procter & Gamble issued urgent corporate warnings regarding severe margin compression due to skyrocketing input and energy costs. The macro-economic fallout expanded rapidly into national policy theaters; the European Commission was forced to slash its Eurozone GDP growth forecasts to just 0.9% for the year, while boosting inflation expectations to 3% as a direct result of the Middle Eastern energy crunch.

#### **4.2 Maritime Logistics and the Bunker Fuel Crisis**

Beyond raw commodity costs, the closing of the Strait of Hormuz created a severe logistics crisis for the global shipping industry, costing operators an estimated \$400 million daily (Transport & Environment, 2023). A critical and unexpected operational vulnerability emerged within the maritime refueling network: the severe disruption of the global supply of 'bunker fuel'—the heavy, residual fuel oil required to power the global container fleet. Because the Persian Gulf represents the foundational production source for this refining byproduct, the blockade choked off supplies to Asia's primary refueling hubs, most notably Singapore. Faced with soaring bunker prices and tight physical availability, global ship operators were forced to implement defensive operational measures. Data from Clarksons Research (2023) revealed that the average speed of bulk carriers and container ships slowed globally by approximately 2% within weeks of the war's outbreak—a practice known as 'blanket slow-steaming' utilized to conserve dwindling, hyper-expensive fuel reserves at the cost of significantly extending international lead times.

#### **4.3 Digital Chokepoints and Subsea Cable Vulnerabilities**

The 2026 U.S.–Iran conflict also highlighted a critical conceptual shift in supply chain risk theory: the convergence of physical maritime chokepoints with global digital infrastructure. In May 2026, Iranian state-linked media floated proposals to leverage and charge access fees for the undersea internet fiber-optic cables running along the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz, declaring them vulnerable operational nodes for Western economies. Because the narrow maritime corridors of the Middle East (the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Strait of Hormuz) function as the primary physical routing paths connecting European, Asian, and African data networks, they constitute severe single points of failure (UNCTAD, 2023). A disruption or deliberate sabotage of these subsea data lines threatens to instantly fragment global digital connectivity. For modern supply chains built on real-time data flows, high-frequency trading, and automated global payment networks, this digital vulnerability represents an unprecedented threat that can trigger rapid financial market fluctuations and halt cross-border transactions independently of physical cargo delays (World Economic Forum, 2024).

### **V. Case Analysis 3: The U.S.–China Trade War and Supply Chain Balkanization**

The cumulative effect of maritime chokepoint blockades and active land wars has driven a permanent structural shift in how global sourcing strategies are formulated. Multinational enterprises are increasingly looking beyond immediate localized conflicts to prepare for long-term sovereign rivalries that threaten to permanently divide the globe into distinct political and economic spheres. The ongoing trade, economic, and technological confrontation between the United States and China represents the primary axis of this structural shift. Charpin and Cousineau (2024) provided rigorous empirical evidence of this trend, documenting the extensive fragmentation of manufacturing supply bases in response to the US-China conflict. Their study shows that aggressive tariff regimes, strict export control lists, and rising national security concerns have effectively broken apart long-standing supplier relationships in East Asia, forcing Western firms to actively diversify their sourcing bases toward friendlier regions like Southeast Asia, India, and Latin America.

This process of dividing once-interconnected global networks into politically insulated, fragmented trading structures is increasingly described in academic literature as 'balkanization.' Golgeci, Johnston, and Gligor (2025) investigated this phenomenon, exploring how nation-states actively weaponize commercial and technological interdependencies to achieve geopolitical leverage. Under conditions of supply chain

balkanization, economic efficiency and cost minimization are completely subordinate to political alignment and national security. Superpowers and regional blocs are actively forcing corporations to construct parallel, redundant supply lines—one for Western-aligned markets and another for the BRICS or eastern-aligned spheres—fundamentally destroying the unified global market that defined the late 20th century (Golgeci et al., 2025).

Successfully navigating this highly fragmented landscape is made even more difficult by deep internal misalignments in how geopolitical risk is perceived across different tiers of a supply network. Fan et al. (2022) conducted crucial empirical research on the perception gaps between international supply chain buyers and their localized tier-one suppliers. Their study revealed a dangerous misalignment: while global buyers at multinational headquarters view regional flashpoints (such as maritime borders or regional territorial disputes) through a macro lens of severe systemic risk, localized suppliers operating directly within those regions often normalize the tension, viewing it as background noise. This perception gap frequently results in severe strategic friction, as global buyers demand aggressive, expensive diversification and safety stock accumulation, while local suppliers resist changing their operational routines, ultimately delaying critical risk mitigation until an actual conflict erupts (Fan et al., 2022).

To thrive under these conditions of permanent sovereign rivalry, corporate leadership must adopt an entirely new strategic mindset that prioritizes broad network viability over narrow cost accounting. Carnovale (2025) mapped out this new paradigm, describing how systemic network resilience must be maintained under conditions of ongoing, unresolved state competitions. Carnovale (2025) argues that leading firms are abandoning the pursuit of thin operational margins in favor of constructing 'sovereign buffer stocks'—large, geographically distributed inventories of critical materials held within politically secure borders. Furthermore, firms are utilizing advanced digital twin simulations and graph theory analytics to continuously stress-test their entire multi-tier supplier visibility, ensuring they can seamlessly reroute procurement paths the moment a regional political friction translates into an active physical disruption.

## VI. Synthesis Matrix and Comparative Dimensions

To provide an integrated view of the academic literature and empirical case data analyzed in this manuscript, Table 1 synthesizes the core findings, empirical methodologies, and structural risk domains addressed across the reviewed developments.

**Table 1: Summary of Literature Review**

Authors & Year	Conflict Domain	Key Methodology	Core Operational Finding	Strategic Recommendation
Bednarski et al. (2026)	Global / Inter-State	Conceptual Framework	Integrates IR theory with supply chain management to model GSCD.	Incorporate state-level volatility into supply base configurations.
Bednarski et al. (2023)	Global / Multi-Region	Systematic Review	Paradigm shift from short-term shock absorption to structural risk pricing.	Move away from JIT models toward regionalized, resilient sourcing.
Li (2026)	Maritime Logistics	Cross-Border Panel Data	Identifies infrastructure threat, freight rate volatility, and customs delays.	Secure alternative logistics nodes and multi-modal transport lines.
Zhang (2026)	Red Sea Crisis	Difference-in-Differences	Quantifies an average 29.5% drop in port throughput due to regional conflict.	Redesign maritime routing to incorporate African cape alternatives.
Tseng & Pilcher (2025)	Red Sea Blockades	Empirical & Interviews	Bypassing chokepoints adds 10-14 transit days, inflating fuel and asset capture.	Build dynamic carrier liability structures and safety stock buffers.
Sarwar (2025)	Russia-Ukraine War	Literature Synthesis	Maps five disruption domains: food, energy, neon/palladium, rail, and finance.	Implement multi-source procurement for specialized raw materials.
Srai et al. (2023)	Russia-Ukraine War	Impact Pathway Analysis	Delineates operational steps required to unhook nodes from active combat zones.	Formulate clear network fragmentation and reallocation protocols.
Wang (2025)	Russia-Ukraine War	Real Options Theory	Weights high fixed-asset write-downs against reputation and long-term compliance.	Treat market exits as strategic real options with upfront risk cost.

Kim et al. (2025)	Russia-Ukraine War	Empirical Case Study	Upstream wire harness shortages halted Western European auto assembly lines.	Eliminate single-source dependencies for custom components.
Al-Nuaimi (2026)	Russia-Ukraine War	Field Qualitative Study	Conflict zones trigger informal shadow logistics and illicit grain networks.	Develop visibility tools to detect and manage black/grey market risks.
El-Gazzar (2026)	Russia-Ukraine War	Management Accounting	Static budgets fail under rapid, conflict-driven commodity price swings.	Adopt continuous rolling forecasts and dynamic variance planning.
Peprah (2026)	U.S.–Iran War	Meta-Analytic Design	Quantifies multi-sector corporate margin degradation driven by energy spikes.	Build cross-sector financial hedging and flexible adaptive strategies.
Charpin & Cousineau (2024)	US-China Trade Conflict	Empirical Analysis	Tariff barriers and regulations forced widespread supplier base decoupling.	Diversify sourcing to India, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
Fan et al. (2022)	Regional Flashpoints	Perceptual Empirical Study	Dangerous risk perception gaps between global buyers and local suppliers.	Standardize risk measurement tools across all sub-tier suppliers.
Golgeci et al. (2025)	Global Superpowers	Qualitative Framework	Weaponized interdependencies lead to permanent supply chain balkanization.	Build parallel, redundant supply lines for aligned political blocs.
Carnovale (2025)	Sovereign Rivalry	Network Graph Analysis	Long-term state friction requires focusing on viability over thin profit margins.	Establish sovereign buffer stocks within secure political borders.

## VII. Comparative Discussion

The cross-case synthesis of the Russia-Ukraine War, the U.S.–Iran War, and the U.S.–China geoeconomic conflict yields an undeniable consensus: the structural integrity of global supply chains can no longer be evaluated separately from the dynamics of international relations. When we map out the collective evidence—ranging from the 29.5% drop in port efficiency recorded by Zhang (2026), to the immediate plant shutdowns documented by Kim et al. (2025), to the \$25 billion corporate loss driven by the closing of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026—it becomes obvious that contemporary supply chain design must undergo an architectural evolution.

A definitive theme emerging from this comparative analysis is the distinction between nodal material dependencies and systemic corridor vulnerabilities. Different types of regional conflicts target distinct layers of the global supply network, requiring differentiated strategic responses. The historic prioritization of cost minimization and lean inventory management was built for a peaceful, unipolar world order that no longer exists. In the current geoeconomic reality, supply chain vulnerability represents a core threat to corporate continuity and sovereign economic security. As Bednarski et al. (2023) emphasize, firms can no longer rely on simple risk buffers or temporary insurance adjustments to weather these crises. Instead, the persistent threat of supply chain balkanization (Golgeci et al., 2025) and ongoing sovereign rivalries (Carnovale, 2025) are forcing a fundamental architectural redesign of global production networks. This redesign is manifested in the strategic realignment of supplier bases away from politically sensitive or highly contested regions (Charpin & Cousineau, 2024).

However, implementing these strategic changes introduces significant corporate friction. As demonstrated by Fan et al. (2022), severe misalignment in how geopolitical risk is perceived across different tiers of the supply network frequently hinders proactive adaptation. Global procurement officers may demand immediate near-shoring or extensive stockpiling based on macro political indicators, while local suppliers downplay the risk, creating operational inertia. Furthermore, the process of decoupling is financially punitive; strategic abandonment of conflict-ridden markets involves massive write-downs of fixed capital assets and the loss of low-cost inputs, a tradeoff that requires complex real options evaluation (Wang, 2025). Managers must also recognize that when legal channels collapse, shadow logistics networks inevitably emerge, requiring sophisticated risk tracking to prevent severe compliance and ethical failures (Al-Nuaimi, 2026).

## VIII. Conclusion

In conclusion, the intersection of regional geopolitical conflicts and global supply chains has ushered in a new era of risk management. The empirical and theoretical evidence accumulated between 2019 and 2026 establishes that lean, single-sourced, hyper-globalized networks are unsustainably fragile in the face of modern

state rivalries. To survive, multinational corporations must formally integrate international relations theory and geopolitical risk indicators into their core operational forecasting, financial accounting, and network layouts. The traditional 'just-in-time' mindset must be replaced by an intentional 'just-in-case' strategic architecture.

Building future-ready, resilient supply chains requires a multi-layered approach: eliminating single-source dependencies for critical customized components; utilizing multi-modal logistics paths and dynamic routing models to bypass highly vulnerable maritime and digital chokepoints; mitigating buyer-supplier perception gaps through standardized risk-tracking software across all sub-tier suppliers; institutionalizing continuous rolling financial forecasts capable of absorbing volatile commodity price swings; and establishing sovereign buffer stocks within politically stable, friendly alliances. While near-shoring, friend-shoring, and supply chain balkanization will increase the baseline cost of production, these structural reconfigurations represent an essential insurance policy against catastrophic operational failure in an increasingly fragmented and volatile world.

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